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In the summer of 1978 a decision was made to devote a special issue of the SIGART
newsletter to the subject of knowledge representation research. To assist in ascertaining the
current state of people's thinking on this topic, the editors (Ron Brachman and myself) decided
to circulate an informal questionnaire among the representation community. What was
originally planned as a simple list of questions eventually developed into the current document,
and we have decided to issue it as a report on its own merits. The questionnaire is offered
here as a potential aid both for understanding knowledge representation research, and for
analysing the philosophical foundations on which that research is based.
The questionnaire consists of two parts. Part I focuses first on specific details, but
moves gradually towards more abstract and theoretical questions regarding assumptions about
what knowledge representation is; about the role played by the computational metaphor; about
the relationships among model, theory, and program; etc. In part II, in a more speculative vein,
we set forth for consideration nine hypotheses about various open issues in representation
research.
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How Is a Knowledge Representation System Like a Piano?
A Questionnaire on Knowledge Representation Research
When we first discussed the idea of editing a special issue of the SIGART newsletter on
knowledge representation, we felt that there were two useful functions such an issue could
serve: first, to present a coherent account of what knowledge representation is; and second, to
identify how each research project could be understood in terms of this analysis.
Unfortunately, we did not ourselves have a clear understanding of the current state of
representation research. Hence a questionnaire.
Two types of question immediately suggested themselves, neither of which seemed
sufficient. We first considered questions focusing on details and particulars; we imagined
asking people how they handled such issues as quantifier scope and multiple inheritance,
whether they used lexical or graphic notation, etc. Clearly some questions of this sort are
valuable, and have been included, but we felt that the questionnaire should go further. Since
we are not convinced that representation research is carried out within a generally shared
framework, we didn't want simply to inquire after endless details.
The second class of question we considered included more comprehensive ones, such as:
"What do you think knowledge representation is all about?", and "What are you basically trying
to do?". The problem with general questions, however, is that they invite equally general
answers. We felt, in fact, that such an approach would elicit responses no more tightly
integrated than a collection of individual research papers.
Finally, therefore, we settled on a third tack: we have attempted to include questions
which, in terms of content, are fairly high level and general, but which are nonetheless posed in
a relatively specific and precise way. These questions arise from genuine curiosity: we don't
think they have "correct" answers; nor have we suggested what our own answers would be. (In
fact we are unsure of our answers to some, and would be hard-pressed to defend our answers
to others.) Nonetheless, the questions betray us: just by articulating them we have inevitably
made reference to our own meta-theoretic framework, and have consequently revealed many of
our biases.
It is possible, therefore, that you will find some of the questions dissonant, and unrelated
to your conception of representation research. If such is the case, instead of responding
directly, we would like you to outline how your understanding differs and suggest how you
would have proceeded. Such "answers" will be more valuable, in ascertaining the "lay of the
land", than half-hearted responses to questions that don't sit comfortably.
We hope that the answers will reveal a coherent sense, among researchers, of the
common enterprise, or -- what would be more interesting -- several distinct, but individually
coherent, conceptions. Since we are trying to uncover decisions and judgments people have
made implicitly, we don't at all expect people to defend their answers, or even to be able to do
so. Our goal is simply to try to articulate the positions that people already hold; the more wide
ranging the responses, therefore, the better. If we find no coherence, we will of course be able
to conclude no more than that we have failed -- no survey could report definitively that there
is no structure in a given discipline. But such an outcome seems unlikely.
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The questionnaire consists of two parts, of which the first is fairly straightforward, the
second more speculative. Part I is in turn divided into four sections: in the first two the
questions are introductory and specific, whereas those in the third are more abstract. In the
fourth we ask you to score your reactions to a tabulated list of common representation issues.
Part II departs from a strict "question-answer" format: instead we put forward nine rather
strong hypotheses about representation research in general, and ask you for your reactions.
Finally: The questionnaire is obviously very long -- it may take an hour or two just to
read. One of the reasons the questions are formulated at such length, however, is to enable you
to answer them briefly. In many cases a few words should be sufficient to indicate your
response. Nonetheless, we appreciate the amount of time it will involve, and we would very
much like to thank you in advance for giving it what time you can.
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Part I -- The Main Questionnaire
Section A -- Background
1. With what representation system or research group are you associated? Is your
involvement with this system primarily from a user's standpoint, or are you involved in
its design? With what other systems have you had substantial experience?
2. What is the best documentation on the representation system you work with? What are
the best accounts of your own work? What papers, written by you or others, best
articulate your basic framework or overall viewpoint?
3. What, very briefly, are your major areas of interest, and intellectual goals, outside the
area of knowledge representation? How does your interest in knowledge representation
fit into this overall conception? How did you first come to focus your attention on
representation issues? Is representation work currently your main concern?
4. Are you prepared to have your responses publically associated with your name, or would
you like them to be kept confidential? If you are willing to be cited, can we take your
responses as authoritative regarding the system, or representative of the group,
mentioned in question 1? (We intend to use responses in a primarily collective way, in
order to identify general trends and positions held. In addition however, if it seems
instructive, we might like to associate specific views with specific projects and people.
Requests for confidentiality, however, will of course be strictly honoured.)
Section B -- Questions On Your Particular System
To simplify wording, the questions in this section assume that all your representation work is
embodied in one specific system. If this is not even approximately the case, you may wish to
identify several different systems or projects at the outset, and then refer to them explicitly in
answering the questions.
Some of the questions here point to questions in the next section, usually to longer discussions
of the same or similar issues.
5. What do you take to be the goals of your particular research system?
6. Is your system designed for a specific use? (For example, is it primarily designed to serve
as the framework for a medical decision making program? Is it aimed as an exploration
into reasoning about causality and action? etc.) Would you characterize it more as a tool
for people building research systems, or more as a self-contained investigation of
theoretical issues?
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7. On what particular questions are you currently working? (As detailed and specific a list
as possible would be appreciated, such as:
a: Inference mechanisms to reason with intensional set descriptions.
b: Control of reasoning processes using defaults.
c: Adjudication of conflicting inheritances arising through multiple description.
d: Common sense reasoning with negation.
e: Investigating what kinds of question are answerable using parallel marking
schemes.
etc.)
8. To what domains has your representation system been applied? Why?
9. Are there people who use your system outside of your immediate research group? If so,
roughly characterize what their interests are, how they are using it, etc.
10. (Cf. question 30.) Have you constructed, or are you in the process of constructing, any
representation "packages" or "modules" which you could distribute for general community
use?
11. Would you characterize your system more as
a: a declarative language,
b: a language plus an interpreter, or
c: a language and a set of utility subroutines for manipulating structures in it?
12. To what extent is your representation system implemented? In what language?
13. Does your system handle quantification? If so, does the way in which you deal with it
differ substantially from the way it is addressed in predicate logic? If so, how? (For
example, you might leave the "scope" of quantifiers either ambiguous or unrepresented.)
14. Does your system employ special techniques for dealing with contexts? If so, in what
situations do you use them? (Focus of attention? Belief models? Hypotheticals?
Contingent descriptions?) What is the basic context mechanism?
15. Various languages (FRL, KRL, KLONE, etc.) require the user to use the implementation
language (usually LISP) to encode the routines that manipulate the declarative
representation structures. Is this true of your system, or does it include its own language
for procedural specification?
16. Does your system use any form of procedural attachment? If so, what is the basic
mechanism of attachment? Borrowing KRL terminology, what traps and triggers do you
honour; what servants and demons? (E.g. UHEN-INSTRNTIATED, TO-IDENTIFY, UHEN-DESCRIBED,
etc.) Do you provide standard subroutines to be called when the traps and triggers are
activated, or do you have users write their own programs for these cases?
17. In representing facts about a paper, one of the things you might want to say is something
like "the thesis of this paper is that dinosaurs were warm-blooded". Imagine a "frame-like"
system, having a frame called "PRPER" with a slot called "THESIS". If you were "filling" this
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slot in the example just given, you would need to fill it not with a description of
dinosaurs, warm-bloodedness, or anything of that sort; rather, you would need to fill it
with (the representation of) the proposition "that dinosaurs were warm-blooded". How
does your system deal with this kind of explicit use of propositions?
18. Various systems organize their deductive components around one or more central ideas;
pattern matching, for example, has sometimes served this purpose. The various
inferential strategies are then defined in terms of this underlying conception. Is the
reasoning part of your system organized around any such axes? If so, what are they?
19. In LISP, quotation is defined in terms of protection against one application of an
evaluation process. We suggest in question 38 that, for representation work, we do not
have any obvious notion of an evaluation process ready at hand. Quotation must
therefore mean something else in representation systems. What do you think quoted
descriptions are? Do you deal with them in your system, and if so what do they mean?
20. Suppose we characterize "meta-descriptions" (or "meta-symbols") to be descriptions (or
symbols) whose referents are other symbols or structures within the representation system
(cf. question 38, and hypothesis 9 in part II). Do you make use of any such meta-
descriptions in your work?
21. Have you encoded a representation of your system in itself? of just the syntactic
language? If so, does the system make any substantial use of this recursive/
reflexive/meta-circular description? How? If not, do you plan to construct such an
encoding, and do you plan to have your system make use of it?
22. In your system, do the representation structures themselves bear any assertional weight
(i.e. does the existence of a structure imply anything about whether the proposition it
represents is taken to be true)? If not, how do you assert anything? If so, how do you
deal with hypotheticals, negation, and quoted descriptions?
23. (Cf. hypothesis 4 in part II.) In most systems based on predicate logic, when the systems
are defined the predicate letters and constants are left "uninterpreted", in the sense that
the predicates and individuals which they denote are left unspecified. A certain number
of signs, however, are given a fixed interpretation: the truth-functional connectives (RNO,
OR, NOT, IMPLIES, etc.), and the quantifiers, for example. In other words, no matter what the
application, these signs always mean the same thing. In your system, what signs, if any,
are given a fixed interpretation?
24. Which other systems in the field are most similar to yours? Which are most different?
Very briefly, what do you see to be the major similarities and differences?
25. What other work, in our field or in another, current or historical, has had the most
substantial influence on your own?
26. By what criteria would you like people to judge your work? Do you think that all work
in representation should be judged in this way, or does this apply in some specific way to
your own project? If the latter, what are the characteristics of your system that
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determine that these evaluation criteria are the relevant ones? (Le. what would another
system have to have in common with yours to deserve the same kind of evaluation?)
Section C -- Foundations
First a few questions about the overall nature of the enterprise:
27. The phrase "the representation of knowledge" can be taken to mean various different
things. For purposes of discussion, we assume that:
a: In building or using a representation system, one is supposed to "represent"
something. In addition, this representation will somehow involve
computational systems or ideas.
b: A symbol is something which stands for something else. A representation is a
particular kind of symbol, in which the structure of the symbol itself is
perceived to correspond in some way with the structure of the thing that the
symbol stands for. (Thus a painting of a farm might be a representation,
because parts of the painting could be set in correspondence with parts of the
actual farm.)
c: One can (at least informally) distinguish among:
P: the world
a: the active process of an intelligent person thinking about the world
R: the language a person uses in speaking or writing about the world
s: an abstract thing called "knowledge about the world"
d: In any computational system, one can (at least informally) distinguish among:
x: a set of data structures
Y: a program or interpreter which manipulates these data structures
z: the overall active behaviour or process resulting from the running of v
over x.
Given this breakdown, between what two things do you envisage the "representation"
relationship? For example, do you think that x is meant to represent P (or R or s)? Or is
z supposed. to represent Q? Both? Neither? ... If both, do you think the two goals could
potentially come into conflict? Additionally: do you have a more precise
characterization of the representation relationship that you use?
28. It is unclear to what extent the study of natural human language relates to research in
knowledge representation. Many terms which arose first in the study of natural language
(such as "proposition", "description", etc.) crop up in discussions of representation; this
might be because these linguistic notions are necessarily central, or it might be because
they are the best way we have of talking about some set of issues. More specifically:
a: If your goal is to construct computer programs able to converse in natural
language, then the study of language would obviously be of central concern.
b: If your goal is more aptly described as constructing computer programs able
to model intelligent thought processes, then the study of natural language is
presumably relevant only to the extent that it sheds light on the underlying
thought processes.
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To the extent that they can be distinguished, would you characterize your inquiry as
primarily an investigation into the structure of language or more as an investigation into
the structure of thought? If the latter (or if it includes the latter), how important do you
feel the study of language is to your work? If it is relevant, do you find it requisite to do
that study yourself, or are you able to base your work on the linguistic inquiries of
others?
29. (Another question about language:) Three assumptions:
a: The successful result of a study of natural language syntax will consist in the
identification of a number of syntactic categories, and rules as to how words
or structures in these categories may combine and interact.
b: Similarly, the successful result of knowledge representation research will
consist in the identification of a number of representation "categories", and
rules as to how structures in these categories are allowed to combine and
interact.
c: In order to construct a program able to converse in natural language, one
will need routines to translate from the "syntactic" accounts of natural
language to the "internal" or "meaning" descriptions in terms of representation
structures.
Question: Do you think this translation will be specifiable solely in terms of syntactic
and representation categories, or do you think that the translation will require specific
reference to the individual words and terms to be translated? Put another way, do you
think there could be found a "type-type" correspondence between syntactic and
representational structures, or do you think that the mapping between the two will have
to be specified at the "token-token" level? (For more discussion of similar issues see
hypothesis 4 in part II.)
30. An extended analogy: Consider a performance of a musical composition such as a piano
concerto. There are numerous ingredients which contribute to the total performance:
the composition itself, the piano, the style in which the music was written, etc. We can
set up an analogy between the many components of a musical performance, and those of
a knowledge-based AI program. The musical composition, for example, can be compared
with the complete computer program. In both cases this totality -- composition or
program -- is influenced by its many constituent elements.
Musical scales and modes can be compared with the primitive elements out of which the
representation structures will be built: the one consists of a basic palette of available
notes; the other a set of concepts, nodes, or relationships. Note that scales and modes
have histories: the well-tempered scale, which is used almost universally in Western
music (which divides the octave into twelve geometrically equivalent intervals) was
invented only a few centuries ago. Similarly, modes -- that is, the selections of notes of a
scale used as the primary melodic base of a composition -- are particular to different
cultures (major and minor being the most common in Western classical music). One can
imagine music research programs to develop new scales and modes.
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The piano can be compared with the underlying computer language or hardware in
terms of which program is implemented. The design and construction of pianos has its
own history and evolution; grand pianos, for example, have key action (the arrangement
of levers and hammers intermediating between the key and the string) that is superior to
that used on upright pianos. One might compare this with the design of implementation
techniques such as hash-coding or clever indexing schemes.
In music there are also various abstract forms and building blocks out of which larger
compositions are constructed. It is because two compositions share similar building
blocks that one thinks of them as being in a similar style. Some of the components are
local, such as the arpeggio (a series of successively ascending notes), the cadence (a
progression of harmony structure), or the trill. There are also broader organizational
principles, such as sonata form, styles of orchestration, or kinds of instrumental group. In
addition, many kinds of music (particularly popular) are distinguished by their rhythmic
style. All these various ingredients can be compared to various building blocks out of
which programs are built, such as general purpose subroutines, "packages" for performing
some kind of computation, and styles of programming (such as the use of tail-recursion).
There are of course interactions at all levels: the music a composer will compose is
constrained by the scale and style he adopts; the piano design is affected by the scale (the
piano and the well-tempered scale, in fact, developed simultaneously). Some of the
interactions are strong, but some are much more tenuous: the kind of keyboard action on
a piano and the lyrical quality of the melody played on it affect each other only very
indirectly. And again, comparable interactions, of similar flavour, can be found among
the different facets of computational systems.
Nowhere in this discussion have we mentioned the role played by a knowledge
representation system in an AI program. There are various alternative views that come
to mind: you might, for example, compare the enterprise of designing knowledge
representation systems or languages to one or more of:
a: designing pianos;
b: discovering scales or modes;
c: developing repertoires of melodic or rhythmic ingredients.
How do you think the role of knowledge representation research is best characterized, in
terms of this musical analogy?
Two questions about semantics:
31. One can characterize:
a: a calculus as a set of formal structures, and a set of conventions for
manipulating them (cf. McDermott's "notational engineering").
b: a theory of (denotational) semantics as a theory of how the constituent
structures of a calculus correspond to objects or relationships in the world.
(Note that this notion of semantics is that used by mathematicians and
logicians; it is not the semantics of linguists.)
c: a logic as an integration of a calculus with a corresponding theory of
semantics.
I : .. .
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According to this simple account, if you were developing only a theory of semantics, you
would have to assume some calculus; if you were working only on a calculus, you would
either ignore, or assume, a theory of semantics. If you were desiging a logic, however,
you would have to be concerned with formulating both a calculus and a corresponding
theory of semantics. Given this breakdown, would you characterize your project more
as developing a calculus, a theory of semantics, or a logic?
32. We see in the computer science and philosophy literature references to various
cbnceptions of semantics: denotational, operational, relational, and procedural, to name
just a few. In addition, the linguistic tradition has its own conception of semantics.
Which of these notions, if any, are of relevance to your work? Why or why not?
And four questions about logic:
(Note: By the phrase "predicate logidc", as used in this questionnaire, we mean the logic of
predicates and objects roughly as currently conceived by philosophers and mathematicians.
This would include quantificational and perhaps modal logic, as well as the propositional
calculus, and would also include both its traditional semantics and syntax (if not its traditional
notation). What we do not mean is logic in as general a sense as is suggested in question 31
above.)
33. Quine has said that the ontological claims (assumptions about what exists in the world)
made by predicate logic are merely that there are objects and relationships between them.
Some representation schemes seem to assume the existence of other things, such as
classes, sets, prototypical objects, or concepts. What ontological claims does your system
make about the world?
34. Suppose we distinguish two (extreme) camps:
a: One (represented perhaps by classical predicate logic) where the focus is on
the formalization of statements about what is true, and on determining what
statements can be taken to follow from others, without specific concern for
(formally representing) the processes typically used by people in reasoning
with such statements.
b: The other (represented by most computer languages) where the focus is on
the formalization of procedures to manipulate symbols, without specific
concern for the meaning of those symbols.
. you see your work as being in one, both, or neither of these camps?
35. Many people working in representation are involved in designing new representation
languages -- evidence, presumably, that they find predicate logic inadequate in one or
more ways. Consider various alternative positions one might hold about the relationship
between the new languages and predicate logic:
a: Predicate logic is adequate, notationally and semantically: the hard problems
in representation revolve around questions of what to say, not how to say it.
Designing new languages, therefore, is of no particular interest.
b: Predicate logic, while adequate for expressing a certain range of phenomena,
is incapable of expressing some other kind or range of knowledge. New
languages are needed to extend this expressive power.
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c: Predicate logic, while adequate in some theoretical sense to express anything
one might want to express, is organized or formulated in such a way that
certain generalizations or constraints are not forthcoming in that formalism.
The point of designing new languages is to find organizations which make
these other generalizations self-evident.
d: Predicate logic considers only certain aspects of knowledge, and ignores
others (such as memory organization and access). Consequently the
importance of designing new languages lies in their approach to these other
dimensions of knowledge representation, not in their having a new approach
to issues with which predicate logic is concerned.
e: Predicate logic is founded on certain deep theoretical assumptions which are
fundamentally wrong or inadequate. Consequently, no expression in
predicate logic could be suitable.
Do you feel that predicate logic is inappropriate or inadequate as a representation
system? If so, why? Do any of the positions given above reflect your view? If you find
predicate logic inadequate, do you find it more inadequate as a calculus, or inadequate
semantically (cf. question 31 above)?
36. One sometimes sees translations of new representation languages back into predicate
logic. Whether you think such translations are appropriate probably depends on your
answer to the previous question. In particular (except see also hypothesis 7 in part II),
with each of the five positions set forth above, it would seem that we could associate the
following corresponding position regarding translation:
a': Translation is a good idea, in that it captures what is said in the new
languages, and provides a common ground for detailed comparisons.
b': To the extent that a new language succeeds in enabling the expression of this
new range of knowledge, translation is impossible. However for the types of
knowledge with which logic is concerned, translations would be adequate.
c': Translation is of course possible, but the generalizations and constraints will
be hard or impossible to express in the translated version, and would
certainly never have been discovered in that formulation.
d': Translation, in some sense, would be possible, but it would completely miss
the point. It would be as if you spent a long time working out how to play a
piano concerto on the classical guitar, and someone pointed out that your
arrangement was no different from the piano version because it consisted of
the same notes.
e': Translation is impossible, because of the lack of resonance between the two
schemes. (This would seemingly be true particularly if one rejected the
semantics of traditional logic.)
Do you feel that translations of new languages into predicate logic are capable of
capturing what is essential about them? Which of the opinions above comes closest to
expressing your position?
37. The previous two questions look at relationships between new representation languages
and predicate logic. More generally, one would like to be able to compare any two
representation schemes: to do this, one needs a sense of all the dimensions along which
two representation languages could differ. Which dimensions do you feel are relevant in
the design and comparison of representation languages?
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Some questions more directly concerned with specific issues in representation and in
computation:
38. (The issues raised in this question are explored further in hypothesis 9 of part II.) Many
people, in writing about representation systems (particularly when discussing "frames" and
"slots"), use the word "value". For example, one hears of "filling a slot with a value".
However it is not clear what this term "value" means with respect to representation
structures. Some observations:
a: In computer science, we speak of expressions as having "values", and refer to
a process called "evaluation" which, given an expression, returns its value. For
example, the expression "3 + 4" would be said to have 7 as its value.
b: We have in language the concepts of description (such as "the banjo my uncle
used to play", and "my best friend in third grade") and of name (such as "J. S.
Bach" and "Colette").
c: Descriptions and names are said to have referents, but they do not in any
obvious sense have values. (The referent of the name "J. S. Bach", for
example, is a man who was born in the 17th century.)
d: Since the referents of most ordinary descriptions are external to any
computational system (there are no banjos or musicians in my PDP-1e) there
cannot be a computational process which takes descriptions and returns their
referents.
Is the notion of value, or the concept of evaluation (or anything analagous to it, built for
example on the notion of referent) of any relevance in your system? If so, what is the
notion, and how do you define it?
39. (Continuing question 38.) Another possible stand to take on evaluation and reference is
the following:
a: We can define two descriptions or names to be co-referential if they have the
same referent. Thus the name "J. S. Bach" and the description "the famous
German composer who lived from 1685 to 1750" are co-referential.
b: We can then define a process which, given a description, is supposed to
return a name which is co-referential with the given description.
Does this, or anything similar to it, seem to you a useful move? If so, do you think it can
be adequately defined and usefully controlled?
40. Some current languages (FRL, KRL, predicate logic, etc.) use a lexical syntax -- that is, their
structures are presented in terms of things that look roughly like words and punctuation
marks, assembled together according to certain rules of concatenation. (You could
imagine typing these structures on a typewriter, for example.) Some other languages
(many versions of semantic nets, KLONE, etc.) use a primarily graphical notation, at least for
pedagogical purposes. Which kind of syntax is used in your system? Do you think there
is any substantial difference in emphasis (some kind of Whorfian effect) that attaches to
this difference and which, therefore, makes it important? If so, what do you see to be the
essence of the distinction?
41. (A question on co-reference and projection.) As suggested in question 39, one possible
account of what it means to fill in a piece of representation structure with a "value" is
that you fill it with a co-referential name or description. For example, one might say that
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(the value of) the name of Bilbo's friend the wizard is the string "Gandalf" (i.e. the 7-
letter string with first letter "G", second letter "a", etc.) or that the (value of the) grade I
got on my arithmetic test was 83. However, it can be argued that it is not true that the
wizard's name is the string "Gandalf', but rather, that his name is spelled that way.
Similarly, one can argue that the grade I got was not the number 83, but was somehow
symbolized(or expressed) by that number.
David Levy has recently suggested the following terminology: that the string "Gandalf" is
the projection of a name into the "space" or "world" of strings (he uses the term
'description system). Similarly, the number 83 would be seen as the projection of my
grade into the number system.
First: Do you think your own name is some string, or do you think it is spelled as some
string? Secondly: In your system, do you make use of any concept corresponding to this
notion of projection? Do you think such a concept is coherent? If so, do you think that
there is any straightforward "non-projected" co-reference, or do you think every
relationship we call "co-reference" is really some kind of projection between different
description systems?
42. A characteristic shared by many of the new representation languages is that of being
"object-oriented": the declarative structures are organized around formal representations
of objects. One can identify three primitive conceptual relationships typically employed
in systems of this sort:
a: The relationship between one individual and a "less specific" individual or
class. Systems which embrace the notion of "classes" tend to use two forms of
this relationship -- one of a class being a subset of another, and the other of an
individual being an element of a class. Systems which opt instead for the
notion of concept or prototype tend to use various flavours of a relationship
typically called "Is-A".
b: The relationship between one individual and another, where the first is a
component or part of the second.
c: The relationship between two representation structures, both of which refer
to the same object. This (as suggested in question 39 above) is often called
co-reference, and is indicated either with an explicit link, or by use of
appropriately bound names.
(Note that in the first two cases, the relationship is often given a different name
depending on which end it is viewed from.) If your language is obejct-oriented, do you
use varieties of these three relationships? If so, do you discriminate more finely, dividing
each of them into more specific classes? (See the following question for a possible reason
why one might want to do this.) Are there other primitive relationships in your system
that do not fit into these categories? If so, what are they?
43. Most current representation schemes seem to deal extensively with the concepts of
"abstraction" and "generalization". Furthermore, these two terms are often used
interchangeably. It is not clear, however, that to do so makes sense. In fact, for purposes
of discussion, let us characterize them differently, as follows:
a: Abstraction is a relationship between individuals, one of which has been
"abstracted away" from some dimension along which the other exists. For
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example, suppose the car I drive is a Volvo PV544. Clearly my car is an
individual. There is also another, more abstract, Volvo PV544, which is
equally an individual. This is a car that was introduced in 1957, was
discontinued sometime in the 1960's, and accelerates less well than the
recently introduced (abstract) Porsche 928. Using our terminology, we
would say that the abstract Volvo PV544 is an abstraction of my car.
Similarly, one would say that the Wednesday of "Wednesday is Prince
Spaghetti day" is an abstraction of the Wednesday of "on Wednesday I lost my
watch"; that the pneumonia of "pneumonia can be cured with antibiotics" is an
abstraction of the pneumonia of "my pneumonia lasted 3 weeks".
b: Generalization is a relationship between concepts, one of which is less-well
specified than the other, and which can therefore be used in describing a
wider range of objects. For example, if I describe my car both as "a Volvo"
and as "a car", then the concept referred to in the second description is a
generalization of the concept referred to in the first. Similarly, the concept
animal is a generalization of the concept grizzly bear.
Do you agree with these characterizations? In particular, do you think the two notions
are fundamentally distinct, or do you think they are (or can be defined in terms of) the
same notion? If you think they are different, does your system deal with one of them?
with both? Even if distinct, they seem related; what do you think is the relationship
between them?
Also: Do you think there are other relationships of this sort -- relationships that hold
between two things, one of which can roughly be described as being "less specific" than
the other?
Several questions about theories, programs, and models:
44. Setting aside, for a moment, issues that deal specifically with representation, a question
about the general role of computer programs in AI theory construction: People talk
informally about "implementing theories", but it isn't clear what they mean. Suppose you
have theory T which claims to explain behaviour B, and that you have implemented
computer program P. Several possible relationships suggest themselves:
a: (P is a theory.) T says something; P is a formal representation of T.
b: (P is a model) T states that there is a correspondence between the behaviour
of P and behaviour B.
c: (P is a model explained by T.) T states that behaviour B can be explained in
terms of certain principles or mechanisms M. P is meant to be an inspectable
example, designed both to exhibit behaviour B and to be explained by
mechanisms M.
It would seem that to demonstrate (a), one would need to show that there is a structural
isomorphism between T and P. (If this is coherent, it is certainly radical, since it would
imply that theories themselves are active. However, see hypothesis 8 in part II.) To
demonstrate (b), one would have to show only that P effects behaviour B. To
demonstrate (c), one would have both to show that P effects B, and also that P is
explained by principles M. Question: Do you take (a), (b), or (c) to be the best account
of the role played by computer implementations in AI theory construction?
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45. Another view, regarding the role of the computer in constructing Al theories, is that the
computer should be viewed as an active scratchpa4 from a practical point of view as
essential, but from a theoretical standpoint as irrelevant, as the paper and pencil of a
mathematician. By this account, no program P would appear in the presentation of
theory T about behaviour B. Do you subscribe to this view?
46. Questions 44 and 45 do not distinguish between general AI theories of intelligence, and
theories specifically about the representation of knowledge. Picking up the piano analogy
again, one can identify two obvious positions one might hold:
a: (Knowledge representation systems are tools.) Since the enterprise of
building knowledge representation systems is like designing pianos, the
possibilities in question 44 would apply not to representation systems, but
only to theories (and programs) built on top of them. Representation
systems, therefore, should be judged only by whether they facilitate the
development of other higher-level theories and programs.
b: (Knowledge representation systems are ingredients.) Since the enterprise of
building knowledge representation systems is like developing scales, cadences,
or arpeggios, the issues raised in questions 44 and 45 are relevant to
representation theories directly.
Does position (a) or position (b) better reflect your opinion?
47. As well as asking about what theories in representation are, we need also to inquire
about how they can be tested. Some observations:
a: One strategy in testing a theory (derived from the traditional sciences) is to
identify what phenomena it would predict, and what phenomena it would
exclude, and then to verify that the predicted ones indeed occur, and that
the excluded ones do not.
b: In linguistics this strategy often takes the following form: the grammars set
out by proposed theories are tested to ensure that they reject so-called "bad"
sentences (those with syntax unacceptable to native English speakers).
c: The purpose, in making sure that theories exclude phenomena which do not
occur, is to guard against the construction of overly general (and therefore
content-free) theories.
d: It seems hard to imagine a lucid and compelling demonstration of how a
given thought, inconceivable to the human mind, is impossible to represent in
a proposed representation scheme.
In light of these observations, do you think there is any kind of theory-testing, analogous
to the linguists' testing of bad sentences, that is appropriate in representation work? If so,
in what does it consist? If not, how do you suggest testing representation theories?
Specifically, do you feel that it is important to ensure against the construction of overly
general representation schemes, or do you think that simply attaining coverage is a
sufficient requirement?
And finally:
48. Some of the emerging cognitive science programs around this country see artificial
intelligence as being allied with psychology, linguistics, and perhaps education, as well as
computer science, but not as being so close to philosophy. This questionnaire, on the
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other hand, reflects a belief that philosophical questions are relevant to AI. What do you
see to be the connection between representation research and these other disciplines?
What do you see to be the most important contributions we bring to these studies from
our computational background?
49. Suppose that tomorrow you were appointed philosopher-king. What 5-year plan would
you mandate for the representation community? (In a hundred words or less.)
Section D -- Specific Representation Issues
Even a casual survey of the representation literature quickly reveals several hundred terms that
are used, more or less technically, in refering to various aspects of the discipline. There are
notions as cosmic as knowledge and concept, and as specific as descriptions ofprototypical sequence
elements, as external as an object and as technical as a trigger to be invoked when an ungrounded
anchor is made primary. And in between lie myriads of frames, defaults, and structured objects.
Rather than ask you to react to (or define) hundreds of words, we have assembled a list of
issues that seem to be of current concern to the representation community. They are listed
below, grouped informally into eight categories. In the space at the right of each line (on the
answer sheets) put a check in the column(s) which you feel best describe the issue, according to
the following scheme:
a: An issue we (as a field) adequately understand.
b: An issue you are currently investigating, or which you address in your system.
c: An issue as yet unsolved, and important to investigate.
d: An issue as yet unsolved, but not of central concern at the moment.
e: A false issue, in the sense that you feel that it is an issue that should not be worried
about. (Some may feel this about a search for canonical representation forms, for
example.)
f: A valid enough issue, but outside the proper domain of "representation".
g: A vacuous or vague piece of jargon -- a term of no lasting value.
(Notes: In sections A and B, the issue to be considered is the representation of entities in each of
the categories. Also, feel free to split up, and respond individually to, the various terms in each
group, if your estimation of their status differs.)
Ontology and epistemology, basic:
1: Discrete objects
2: Structured objects
3: Classes, kinds, and instances
4: Prototypical or stereotypical objects
5: Individuals: criteriality, identification, individuation, and uniqueness
6: Individuals: abstractions, manifestations, and instances (see question 43)
7: Concepts
8: Ordinality and measure
9: Plurality (sets, collections, sequences, membership, partial orders, etc.)
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10: Properties, qualities, and attributes
11: Quantification, quantificational scope, etc.
12: Continuity and substance (mass objects, stuff, etc.)
Ontology and epistemology, more complex:
13: Questions and commands
14: Goals and plans
15: Mechanisms: function, purpose, implementation, etc.
16: Causality, causal implication, etc.
17: Messages and linguistic expression
18: Spatial knowledge
19: Temporal knowledge
20: States, events, actions, change, etc.
21: Procedural knowledge (e.g. how to cook)
22: Processes
23: Situations and contexts
24: Abstract concepts derived from spatial metaphors, such as symmetry, parallelism,
adjacency, etc.
Relationships between concepts:
25: Abstraction, generalization, and specialization
26: Multiple perspectives and multiple viewpoints
27: Description by comparison and by differentiation
28: Modification of descriptions (e.g. "very red")
29: Lambda abstraction
30: Mutually exclusive categories
Foundations and semantics:
31: Descriptions, representations, symbols, etc.
32: Expressions, pointers, names, identifiers, labels, etc.
33: Propositions, assertions, predications, relations, and functions
34: Reference, co-reference, and denotation
35: Intension and extension
36: Quotation and quoted descriptions
37: Truth and meaning
Logical properties and relationships:
38: Ambiguity
39: Declarative conditionals
40: Conjunction, disjunction, and negation
41: Contingent descriptions
42: Implications: temporal, causal, and inferential
43: Canonical forms and primitives
44: Completeness, logical adequacy, redundancy, and validity
45: Contradictions and consistency
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Issues in deduction:
46: Evaluation, interpretation, simplification, and unification of descriptions
47: Induction, abduction, deduction, etc.
48: Inheritance, instantiation, and reasoning with defaults
49: Recognition
50: Pattern matching: residues, partial results, and sharing of results
51: Reasoning by analogy
52: Memory chunking, accessibility, and resource limitation
53: Indexing and retrieval
54: Depth of processing, partial computation, partial results, and failures
55: Searching, matching, and describing: frameworks in which to cast inferential
processes
Knowledge treated as knowledge:
56: Assertion and denial of propositional content
57: Beliefs, hypotheses, and models of other people's knowledge and belief
58: Certainty, probability, and strength of belief
59: Meta-knowledge, meta-description, and meta-circular descriptions
Technical and formal notions:
60: Frames and slots
61: Nodes, links, and roles
62: Partitions, contexts, spaces, and other organizational mechanisms
63: Hierarchies, networks, and lattices
64: Agendas, priority queues, and process scheduling
65: Triggers and traps, servants and demons, and procedural attachment
66: Inference rules and production rules
Part II -- Some Non-Standard Hypotheses and Arguments
In this second part we have listed a set of hypotheses and arguments, each of which
makes a strong claim about some aspect of knowledge representation. In each case, indicate
whether you think the hypothesis or argument is obviously true, or obviously false; likely, or
unlikely: generally questionable; or so vague as to be incoherent. (Remember that we are not
necessarily advocating these hypotheses: in fact we have included some with which we
disagree.)
In each case we present both a hypothesis and an argument. In some instances, the
argument is essential: it may be as important as the conclusion which we draw from it, or it may
even be necessary in order for the hypothesis to make sense. In others cases, the hypothesis by
itself sums up the essence of what we are trying to set forth, and the argument is included only
to convey at least a plausible sense of why one should take the hypothesis seriously. Cases of
the latter sort are marked by having their "argument" sections introduced in parentheses.
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In general, however, if you react differently to the hypothesis and to the argument
(you believe one but not the other, for example), we would like you to indicate this explicitly.
Similarly, when possible objections and secondary hypotheses are included, we ask you to
comment briefly on whether you believe each of them.
1. Reference vs. Co-reference:
Hypothesis:
Argument:
Nothing that has been learned in philosophical theories of reference has any
bearing on representation theories of co-reference.
Reference is a relationship which holds between a symbol and world; co-
reference, a relationship between two symbols. While co-reference can
ultimately be defined only in terms of reference (two co-referential symbols
must by definition refer to the same thing, presumably), apart from this there is
no relationship between the two notions.
2. Continuity and Stuff:
Hypothesis 1: It is impossible to construct a formal symbol representing any continuous object
(according to the definition of representation given in question 27 of part I).
(Argument): a: Formal symbols are inherently discrete.
b: The common world is inherently (if only partially) continuous.
c: The task of knowledge representation is to construct symbols whose
structure corresponds to the structure of that which, as symbols, they
denote.
Objection: The hypothesis would be true only if one ignores the temporal dimension of
denoting (see the next hypothesis), since the temporal dimension of a formal
computational system is apparently (i.e. as far as the system itself can tell)
continuous.
Hypothesis 2: To the extent that we can construct a formal symbol representing any
continuous object, it must be the temporal dimension of the formal model which





The temporal structure of an active process (i.e. its structure in the temporal
dimension) may denote some aspect of the structure of the object being
symbolized.
Computational systems are inherently active, and the temporal dimension is as
basic a part of the structure of computational symbols as any other. While it is
easiest to suppose that the temporal structure of a computational process should
correspond to (denote) the temporal structure of the world being thought
about, there is no a priori reason to assume that time should map directly to
time: perhaps the mapping relationships could be more complex.
In conceiving of a spiral staircase, the representation relationship holding
between the "conceiver" and the staircase might be that the temporal aspect of
the reasoning process corresponds somehow to the circular windings of the
stairs. Or, in analysing a car engine, the temporal aspects of the analyser might
structurally correspond in some way with the progress of the fuel through the
engine.
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4. Second Order Languages:
Definitions: We first need some definitions: (We will assume a representation language
called REPL.)
a: By '"first order structure" we refer to any particular terms which are
individually referenced in the definition of the system's behaviour. Put
another way, they are the primitive vocabulary which the system
recognizes. For example, the first order structure of LISP would include
things like "CRR", LABDBA", "QUOTE", and "TERPRI". The first order structure of
REPL might include things like "OBJECT", "WHEN-IDOENTIFIED", and "Is-R". The
first order structure of predicate logic would include things like the
truth-functional connectives, the quantifiers, and any modal operators.
(See question 23 in part I.)
b: By "second order structure" we refer to the meta-structural categories in
terms of which the system is defined. The second order structure would
include all the meta-syntactic categories, types of operation, etc. For
example, in LISP the second order structure would include the S-
expression, the atom, applicative form, etc. The second order structure
of REPL might include things like INDIVIDUAL-NODE, ISA-LINK, and co-
REFERENCE-POINTER. The second order structure of predicate logic would
include things like the assertion, the proposition, and predicate-argument
form.
Discussion: A few comments on the distinction:
a: First order structure corresponds more closely to the lexical words in
terms of which the system is defined; second order structure corresponds
more closely to its grammatical categories.
b: In general, names which identify second order structures are names of
types, instances of which comprise the various structural pieces of the
system. Names which identify first order structures do not name things
which you can find in the structures of the system; however, what you
do find are occurences of the names themselves.
c: For example, in LISP you find lots of S-expressions, but you don't find the
atom "S-EXPRESSION"; hence "S-expression" is the name of part of LISP's
second order structure. However, you do find the atom 'RansoR", but you
don't find any "lambdas" (although Guy Steele has recently argued that
this should be changed). Hence "lambda" is part of LISP's first order
structure.
Hypothesis: Ideally, a representation language should consist of only.
a: A well-defined structural definition phrased only in terms of second
order structures, and
b: An interpretation procedure defined only with reference to second-order
structures.
Comment: Note that the LISP 1.5 evaluation procedure does not satisfy this restriction,
since it tests for atoms in function position being Eo to the constant, '"LRnOR".
(Argument): This argument assumes the position set forth in point (c) of question 44 in part
I: that an "appropriate" AI computer program P should be explained by some
theory T in terms of some mechanisms M. From this starting point, we can
make the following observations:
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a: Scientific theories -- for reasons of economy, generality, elegance, etc. --
usually state whatever they state in terms of classes of events, behaviours,
objects, etc., not in terms of individuals. Gravity, for example, is a
powerful theory because it applies to all objects, not simply to apples in
Pisa. Similarly, powerful theories of inheritance or deduction will
presumably apply to all concepts with particular structural properties (or
something like that), rather than applying specifically to a few identified
instances.
b: There are two ways in which this "law of generality" applies to
representation systems. First, suppose you take representation systems
themselves to be of theoretical interest (i.e. you believe they are
ingredients, not tools). It follows that the most general explanation of the
behaviour of a representation system should be in terms of its categories,
not in terms of specific instances of its categories.
c: Secondly, suppose instead that you consider a representation language to
be an implementational base, on top of which program P is implemented.
Since P is to be explained in terms of mechanisms M, there is likely to be
a correspondence between the second order structure of the language
and the principles M. In this case, if the interpretation process were to
make reference to the first order structure of the language, and the
theory were to offer an explanation in terms of second order structural
categories, it would be difficult to show that the theory legitimately
accounted for the behaviour of the program. It might be possible, by
inspecting the behaviour of the interpreter, to demonstrate the legitimacy,
but it is hard to imagine why the interpreter should need to refer to first-
order instances, if the theory is able to avoid doing so.
d: Finally: It is always possible, of course, for a theory to refer to first-order
structure, even if the interpreter does not. This direction of imbalance
creates no problems. However, since the ideal representation system
should be able to support as powerful, and therefore as general, theories
as possible, in its own definition it should make no reference to first-
order structure.
5. Programming Considered Harmful -- Sense 1:
Hypothesis:
(Argument):
Contrary to popular opinion, the worth of constructing a running computer
program which "implements your theory" (see question 44 in part I) is roughly
inversely proportional to the extent to which you understand it, and hence a
bad idea.
a: It is always possible to construct ad hoc programs to model any specific
given behaviour, without having reached any deep understanding of that
behaviour.
b: Contructing computer programs requires paying attention to a myriad of
details which consume time but are of no theoretical interest.
c: To the extent that any theoretical claim or insight is clear and well-
understood, its structure should be comprehensible, and its worth
apparent, independent of any implementation.
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Objection: Indeed, the construction of a computer program is irrelevant in conveying the
content or meaning of a theory. The reason to construct a computer
implementation is not to see what the theory says, but to see whether it is right.




Imperative constructs in representation system programs can bear no theoretical
weight.
In order to construct an active computational model of theoretical interest, one
ought not give the commands which effect the right behaviour, but descriptions
of that relevant behaviour. This implies that the interpreter should be able to
"understand" such descriptions, rather than simply react to straightforward
directives. In more traditional computational terminology, one could say that
in representation systems, data structures may be of theoretical interest, but
code is not.
Since any programs we construct are of value only to the extent that they say
something about some world, we have to know how the formal objects of the
program correspond to the objects of the world we are trying to explain. (This
is presumably the raison d'etre of denotational semantics). Computer programs
may consis& of symbols, representations, descriptions, commands, etc. (whatever
any of those might be). It is at least intuitively reasonable to imagine our having
an account of how symbols, representations, and descriptions might correspond
to the world. However it is not obvious how computational commands or
imperatives could correspond. In particular:
a: It is not hard to see how the system's behaviour, resulting from the
commands, might correspond to some behaviour in the world. The
problem is rather that the correspondence between the commands
themselves, and that behaviour, is obscure. In particular, you can think of
a description of a computer process as analagous to a map of a road,
whereas imperatives are analogous to road signs along the way. The
problem is that the road signs are too local, they may say "turn right" or
"turn left", but they don't convey an overall sense of the road. Each
simply relates the next incremental section of the road to the previous
section. In a similar manner, none of the imperatives of a computer
program impart an overall sense of the process they are directing.
b: Constructing denotational theories of semantics for imperative constructs
is therefore problematical. Some of the problems have to do with the
locality: even if it were possible to account for some correspondence,
such an account might be at a level too local to be interesting. Worse,
there may simply not be any correspondence, at the level of the
computational imperatives; all the structure of the process which
corresponds to the structure being represented may be at a higher level
than that of any given imperative command.
c: It may be objected that issues of locality and issues of imperatives are
orthogonal -- that there are local and non-local descriptions, and local
and non-local commands. However the fact is that as computational
structures become more non-local, they tend to become more
description-like and less command-like.
(Part II) Page 23
How Is a Knowledge Representation System Like a Piano?
d: There are, however, problems more substantial than ones of locality. As
suggested above, since the imperative constructs direct a process onto a
new part of its path, such constructs make only implicit reference to the
very process which they command. Consequently, there is no part of the
construct directly corresponding to the active process under
consideration. Hence there is no part of the construct which can bear
the denotational relationship to the world.
7. Turing-equivalence Irrelevant:
Discussion: One often hears arguments that two computer languages are equivalent in
expressive power, because they are both Turing machines, and (by Church's
thesis) they can therefore both effect any behaviour that can be algorithmically
specified. The hypothesis for discussion is that such "Turing-equivalence" is a
vacuous notion when dealing with representation languages.
Hypothesis: In order to demonstrate that two representation languages are equivalent, one
must show that they are not only behaviourally equivalent, but also structurally
equivalent in such a way as to be equivalent semantically. One must
demonstrate the equivalence, that is, of their referential apparatus. In particular,
traditional notions of Turing-equivalence do not apply.
Argument: First, a premise:
a: In order to be a legitimate representation language, a language must
include some account of how its data structures correspond to the world
-- some theory of denotational semantics (that is, by question 31 in part I,
it must be a full-fledged logic).
Second, suppose we are presented with representation languages A and B.
Some observations:
b: The way that in practice one demonstrates the equivalence of two
computer languages is to implement each one in the other.
c: Implementation does not in general preserve the identity of data
structures. (For example: In the case at hand, suppose one started with
A, implemented B in A, and then implemented a new A' in this B. The
data structures in A' will not, in general, end up mapped exactly onto
their equivalents in A.)
d: From (c) it follows that the normal way we implement languages in
other languages does not preserve the denotational correspondences of
the data structures with the world.
Implementation of one language in another, therefore, since it does not
preserve denotational correspondences, does not constitute equivalence
between representation languages. (This should not be surprising, since
Turing-equivalence is based on behavioural, not structural, equivalence.)
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The hypothesis makes reference to the following two definitions:
a: A theory is made of sentences (or propositions), and has a structure that
is different from the structure of the phenomenon it explains.
b: A model is not made of sentences (or propositions), and does have a
structure that corresponds to the structure of the phenomenon it models.
The definitions of model and theory given above are inappropriate.. In
particular, the boundary between the two notions should be made much looser,
since computer programs can simultaneously exhibit features of both.
Until the advent of the computer this distinction may have been sharp.
However, since:
a: the data structures of computer programs can be so closely related to
propositions; and
b: the data structures of computer programs can also be thought of as
ingredients out of which working models can be constructed,
it follows that a computer program can simultaneously be both a model and a
theory.





A coherent and simple concept can be defined which subsumes both the notion
of evaluation of LISP and other applicative languages, and the notion of
reference-finding (i.e. searching for, or identifying, the referent of a description
or name) that is used in representation languages.
First, we will argue that the evaluation procedure of LISP can be understood as
a process which returns the referent of an expression, except in those cases
where that referent is external to the system. In those cases, it returns some
canonical symbol standing for the referent. Second, we will suggest that this is
just the kind of "reference-finding" procedure which is needed in
representation.
The argument speaks of numerals Whereas numbers are external and abstract
entities, numerals (such as "I" and "5239.4") are symbols, of a particular
canonical kind, which denote numbers.
a: The common-sense notion of evaluation, as used in ordinary speech, and
as regards mathematical expressions, is of a procedure which takes
expressions and return numbers, not expressions denoting numbers. For
example, note that in point (a) of question 38 in part I, the last sentence
reads as follows: ... the expression "(3 + 4)" would be said to have 7 as its
value ... . In particular, it does not read: ... the expression "(3 + 4)" would
be said to have "7"as its value....
b: LISP expressions can often be likened to descriptions. For example, the
expressions "(CRR '(A B C))" and "(LIST 'R 'B 'C)" can be associated with
the following descriptions: "the first element of the list (R B C)", and "the
list consisting of the three elements A, B, and c". When a LISP system
evaluates the original expressions, it returns what we would take to be the
referents of the descriptions we have set in correspondence with them.
This is possible because those referents are internal to the system.
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c: If, however, we similarly view certain other LISP expressions as
descriptions, we find that LISP does not return their referents. For
example, when it evaluates the expressions "(+ 3 4)" and "(SQRT 144)", LISP
returns the numerals that denote the referents. Similarly, certain atoms
(such as T, NIL, and the numerals) "evaluate to themselves", not to abstract
notions of truth or falsity, nor to abstract numbers.
d: There is thus a difference between our common-sense notion of
evaluation, and the LISP notion of evaluation. The reasons for this
difference are first that LISP cannot return certain referents (such as
numbers), and second that you don't want those referents. Numerals are
just as useful as numbers; they are, for example, what the arithmetic
routines work with, and they are what we like to see printed out.
e: Just as LISP cannot return the common-sense value of a mathematical
expression, so a representation system cannot return the referent of those
descriptions and names which have external referents. On the other
hand, just as there is no need for LISP to return actual numbers, so there
is no need for representation systems to return the actual referents of
names and descriptions, when those referents are external. What one
needs, in cases like this, is some kind of symbol, analagous to a numeral,
to stand for the referents of the common descriptions of representation
systems.
In summary, one could divide descriptions (and expressions) into two classes:
those with referents outside the system (we will call these first-level symbols),
and those with referents inside the system (i.e. meta-symbols). An "evaluation"
process could then be defined which:
a: Given a meta-symbol, would return its referent,
b: Given a base-layer symbol, would return some kind of "canonical" or
special symbol standing in place of the referent.
Such a process would satisfy the description stated in the hypothesis.
Feedback
What other questions should have been included in this questionnaire? Do you feel that what
you think is important about your project has been touched by these questions? Is there
anything you would like to add?
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